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IMMUNITY-HOW IT WORKS IN REAL LIFE
WARREN D. WOLFSON*
A major issue confronting Americans today is the
amount of power we want to give the federal govern-
ment. That is where do a purportedly free people
draw the line between their government and their
right to be let alone? The subject of immunity
raises moral and philosophical questions that
must be asked about a government's behavior to-
ward its citizens. In each instance where immu-
nity is granted to a witness, a change takes place in
the power relationship between government and
citizen. The line between them becomes blurred. The
witness gives up something; his concerns change.
A practical analysis of this shift in power must
concern itself with two kinds of immunity. By that,
I do not mean "transactional" as against "use" im-
munity. While distinctions between the two are
important, the inquiry is not begun until it
separates voluntary from involuntary immunity.
Some people seek immunity and some have it thrust
upon them. Different questions should be asked in
each instance.
It is not intellectually safe to conclude that
whenever a witness is granted immunity he must be
guilty of a crime. An involuntary witness often
receives immunity simply because a prosecutor wants
to know what the witness knows. He is given use
immunity, the only kind allowed by statute, but his
lawyer will tell him, correctly, that he still may be
indicted. The government might have a taint
problem, and some United States Attorneys have a
policy of not indicting immunized witnesses, but
the possibility of indictment is real in terms of legal
permissibility.
Voluntary witnesses are immunized pursuant to a
strategic decision by the prosecutor. There is no
statutory way to get immunity from prosecution, but
friendly witnesses get it anyway when they, in person
or through their lawyers, sit down and make a deal
with the government.
The issue in either case is not the guilt of the
witness. The decisive factor is the conclusion that has
been reached by the prosecutor and the way he
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communicates that conclusion to the witness or to the
witness's lawyer. For the witness, it is the prosecu-
tor's belief and asserted position that create the
crime. After all, the witness's real fear is the indict-
ment itself. He knows what every prosecutor should
know: that the power to indict is the power to de-
stroy. The witness knows who holds the power;
he reacts to what he is told, although what he is told
is not necessarily a valid legal conclusion.
What must be remembered is that the prosecutor
alone decides who will receive immunity. He can do
it by obtaining a formal court order, by writing a
letter, or by making an oral commitment, but there
is no one outside the Justice Department who has
the power to review or overrule a prosecutor's de-
cision to immunize.
The procedure for obtaining a court-ordered grant
of immunity is the same for witnesses who are
friendly or unfriendly to the prosecution. First, the
local prosecutor decides he wants the testimony.
Then he convinces his United States Attorney that
he ought to begin the machinery for obtaining a
court order. A request, signed by the United States
Attorney, is sent to the Justice Department. The re-
quest is examined and, almost always, a form ap-
proval is sent back. I
On September 22, 1975, I sent a letter to Attorney
General Edward H. Levi asking, among other
things, whether the Justice Department has made
any "meaningful review" of local requests for immu-
nity. The answer, dated November 14, 1975, came
from Deputy Chief Roger A. Pauley: "The stand-
ards for approving requests are being reviewed and
modified at present."' 2 I take this to mean that at
tInvariably, it says:
Your request for authority to apply to the United
States District Court for the - Dis-
trict of for an order re-
quiring to give
testimony or provide other information pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 6002-6003 in the above matter and in any
further proceeding resulting therefrom or ancillary
thereto is hereby approved pursuant to the authority
vested in me by 18 U.S.C. 6003 and 28 C.F.R. 0.175.
Assistant Attorney General
Letter from Roger A. Pauley, Deputy Chief, Legisla-
tion and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division,
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least until November of 1975 the Justice Depart-
ment has been virtually without standards for ap-
proval of the requests. Hopefully, the system will
change. But the point remains valid; decisions that
are basic to the existence of a free people cannot be
left simply to the good faith and judgment of a man
who holds an office at a particular time. Recent his-
tory has made that lesson clear.
When the local United States Attorney receives
approval from Washington, he files a petition before
the presiding judge. All he really has to do is tell the
judge the witness has used or has threatened to use
the fifth amendment. Then he indicates that it is his
judgment as United States Attorney that the witness's
testimony in regard to the investigation before the
Grand Jury is necessary to the public interest.
Defense lawyers in some instances have attempted to
oppose these petitions, citing the lack of factual
allegations. After all, the judge has not been told
the specific area of inquiry or why the witness's
testimony might be relevant to that inquiry. Whether
the evidence could be obtained from other sources is
immaterial. Judges are not eager to receive argu-
ments that the prosecutor is not in good faith,
that his motives are something other than a search
for needed information.
In effect the judge is being asked to sign an or-
der affecting basic rights without being given an
opportunity to exercise judicial discretion. The wit-
ness is told: "Answer all questions or you will go
to jail until you do. Your testimony cannot be used
against you, unless you testify falsely." There is no
other area in the law where a judge is told he must
do so much to a person without pausing to deter-
mine if he should. The judge is, in reality, a rubber
stamp for the prosecutor.
When a defense lawyer is opposed to a grant of
immunity, he should say so to the presiding judge,
clearly stating his reasons. The law is against him,
but the issue must be raised repeatedly. The present
system is unjust, and if change is to come about,
rational opposition must be expressed at every
opportunity.
The Justice Department has kept count of the
number of requests for court-ordered immunity it has
received during the past five years. Some of the
requests involve more than one witness: '
United States Department of Justice, to Attorney General
Edward H. Levi, Sept. 22, 1975.3 1d. 18 U.S.C. § 2514 was repealed, effective December
14, 1974; 18 U.S.C. § § 6002-6004 now cover immunity of
witnesses giving testimony or producing evidence under
compulsion in federal grand jury or court proceedings.
About one-half of the authorizations actually were
used in court during 1970 through 1973. Figures on
actual use were not kept for 1974 and 1975.4 Emerg-
ing from the statistics, or more accurately the lack of
them, is the clear impression that at least for the past
five years the Justice Department really does not
know what local prosecutors have been doing with
their power to grant different kinds of immunity.
Clearly, the power has been used. Any criminal de-
fense lawyer who has practiced in the federal courts
§ 6003 provides as follows:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
may be called to testify or provide other information at
any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the
United States district court for the judicial district in
which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon
the request of the United States attorney for such
district, an order requiring such individual to give
testimony or provide other information which he
refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, such order to become effec-
tive as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, or any designated Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, request an order under subsection (a) of this
section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
18 U.S.C. § 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings.
Section 6004 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
who may be called to testify or provide other informa-
tion at any proceeding before an agency of the United
States, the agency may, with the approval of the
Attorney General, issue, in accordance with subsec-
tion (b) of this section, an order requiring the
individual to give testimony or provide other informa-
tion which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to
become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) An agency of the United States may issue an
order under subsection (a) of this section only if in its
judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
18 U.S.C. § 6004. Certain administrative proceedings.





Period 18 U.S.C. § 2514 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-6004 Total 18 U.S.C. § 2514 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-6004 Total
1971 339 363 702 946 1645 2591
1972 341 364 705 821 1517 2338
1973 11 1149 1160 27 2688 2715
1974* 1314 1314 3305 3305
1975* 1535 1535 3383 3383
* Unsegregated as between 18 U.S.C. § 2514 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-6004.
knows that. Anyone who has kept track of current
history knows it, too. But only recently have we be-
gun to hear any substantial expressions of concern
about the government's use of immunity powers.
The murmurs of discontent coincide in time with
immunity grants in cases involving lawyers, police
officers, businessmen and public officials.
Few words of dissent were heard in the early
1970's when the Internal Security Division of
the Department of Justice began a massive grand
jury campaign against antiwar and leftist groups.
The immunity grant was the chief weapon between
1970 and 1973, when the I.S.D. presented evidence
to more than 100 grand juries in 36 states and 84
cities. More than a thousand witnesses were called.'
Many received little or no notice. They were required
to travel hundreds and sometimes thousands of
miles for their grand jury appearance.
Faced with grants of immunity, witnesses were
compelled to answer questions about political ideas
and associations, about conversations with friends
and neighbors, and about relatives. In short, tradi-
tional first amendment rights were trampled upon
by zealous prosecutors. . The I.S.D. investigation
track of the number of times the government made formal
promises of no prosecution. Those promises do not require
court orders. Although they are not authorized by statute, a
prosecutor's promise-that he will not prosecute is legally
binding. He saves it for cases where the witness's proffered
testimony is attractive enough to warrant governmental
munificence.
5Cowan, The New Grand Jury, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 19.
6The following was typical of the questions used:
I want you to describe for the grand jury every
occasion during the year 1970, when you have been in
contact with, attended meetings which were con-
ducted, or attended by, or been any place when any
individual spoke whom you knew to be associated
with or affiliated with Students for a Democratic
Society, the Weatherman, the Communist Party, or
any other organization advocating revolutionary over-
throw of the United States, describing for the grand
jury when these incidents occurred, who was present,
was a shameful episode in American jurisprudence.
It could not have happened without the unfettered
power to obtain immunity grants."
Criminal defense lawyers who have practiced in
the courts of the Northern District of Illinois have
learned, painfully, that there are different cate-
gories of immunized witnesses. Within these
categories there are degrees. Any attempt to deal with
and understand immunized testimony must carefully
take into account the kind of witness that has been
created and the pressures used to make him that
way.
THE WITNESS WHO IS VOLUNTARY ALL THE WAY
This witness is best characterized by his quick-
ness; that is, an impressively short reaction time.
He is alert to the danger that faces him and wastes
no time before seeking legal advice. His lawyer
weighs the odds, makes suggestions to his client or
accepts some from him, and then visits the prosecu-
tor's office. There, the lawyer learns more about his
client's prospects. Usually, when a lawyer seeks a
deal to avoid a charge against his client, he gives the
prosecutor a fairly detailed idea of what the client
would say should he become a witness. The prosecu-
tor may or may not express deep interest the first
time he hears the proposed testimony. Negotiations
begin.
Of course, not every case is the same; nor is every
defense lawyer and prosecutor. Each has a different
and what was said by all persons there and what you
did at the time that you were in these meetings,
groups, associations or conversations.
Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury Network: How the
Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted a Traditional
Safeguard of Individual Rights, 214 NATION 5 (1972).
7The silence was just as crushing when the Justice
Department used its immunity powers to pursue alleged
hoodlums. Sam Giancana was jailed for a year when he
refused to testify before a grand jury. A new grand jury was
ready to repeat the process, but Attorney General Ramsey




way of dealing with the immunity question. The
suggested scenario is one that haunts every lawyer
who is concerned about the integrity of the fact-find-
ing process in criminal cases. It could happen, and it
probably has.
Assume, as part of a hypothetical fact situation,
that a big-time real estate developer (Developer) has
income tax problems. He has received cash that did
not turn up on his return. An IRS special agent
pays him a visit. The agent explains that he knows
about the cash, but what he really is interested in is
the place to which the cash went. Further question-
ing makes it clear that the agent is interested in the
large new shopping center put up by Developer
after obtaining a vital zoning change. It is at this
point that Developer decides he had better talk to
his lawyer. The agent is put off to another day.
Since Developer has agreed to pay a handsome
retainer, he decides to be frank and open with his
lawyer. The cash, $50,000, was given to Developer's
former lawyer, a self-avowed zoning expert
(Expert), who had said he needed the cash to "take
care of" the zoning commissioner (Commissioner).
It was Commissioner who arranged for the change
that allowed the shopping center to be built. Devel-
oper never met Commissioner, but shortly after the
necessary zoning change was accomplished, the cash
was paid to Expert.
After talking to his client, Developer's lawyer
contacts the IRS agent for the purpose of learning the
name of the assistant United States Attorney handling
the file. Then the lawyer makes an appointment with
the prosecutor. They agree to hold an "off the
record" conversation.
Lawyers have different ways of conducting these
conferences. Some frame their proposals in the fu-
ture conditional: "Suppose my client should say he
gave the money to Expert as a bribe to Commis-
sioner, what would his criminal liability be?" Some
use the straighforward approach: "My client gave
the money to Expert so he could bribe Commissioner.
What are you going to do for my client?" There are
variations of the theme, but the result is the same.
The prosecutor agrees that in return for Developer's
testimony, as proposed, the government will not
charge him with a crime. Developer is off the hook.
The first-in, first-out theory, learned in law school,
has been used successfully. Speed, not virtue, has
been rewarded.
But this does not solve the prosecutor's problem.
He has a fairly good case against Expert, but the
target is, and always has been, Commissioner. At this
point, the prosecutor has to make a decision. He can
decide Expert fraudulently extracted the S50,000
from Developer by falsely claiming he was going to
use the money to bribe Commissioner. After all, as an
experienced zoning lawyer Expert probably knew he
was entitled by law to the zoning change. He could
have told Developer he needed the money for a
bribe; then, when the zoning change went through in
the ordinary course of proceedings, he collected the
money and kept it. Or, the prosecutor could take the
position that the money was paid to Commissioner as
a bribe, since Commissioner did support and vote for
the zoning change. The prosecutor makes the choice
that has been made in so many other cases. Commis-
sioner will be the target.'
Word of what is going on must get to Expert. Per-
haps Developer's lawyer tells him. The special
agent might pay him a visit, or he might receive a
grand jury supoena. At any rate, Expert learns that
Developer had told the government about their
transaction. It is clear that Developer is in the
government lineup and that what he has said to the
prosecutor is accepted and believed.
Expert hires a lawyer, who quickly makes contact
with the prosecutor. It is made clear to Expert that
he is not the real target, that the government is much
more interested in Commissioner. The signals are
sent. We know, says the prosecutor, or the agent,
that Expert received the $50,000 claiming it was to
be a bribe to Commissioner, and that the money was
paid to Commissioner for his help in getting the zon-
ing change. That means that Expert and Commis-
sioner must have met and discussed the bribe at least
once before the zoning change took place. It is a
well-known fact that the two men knew each other
during the time the zoning change proposal was
pending.
Expert is not a fool. He receives the signal and his
lawyer delivers the response: "If Expert tells you
how he bribed Commissioner to go along with the
zoning change, what will you do for him?" In some
cases, the prosecutor will hold out for a plea to a
minor charge with a recommendation of probation,
but if he wants the "target" badly enough, he will
offer complete immunity in return for the testimony.
The case now takes shape. Developer and Expert
will testify against Commissioner. Developer will
show how he generated the cash by going to his safety
8The Northern District of Illinois has been an especially
fertile ground for this type of case. United States v. Wigoda,
521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Colitz,
Crim. No. 75-66 (N.D. Ill., bench trial, not guilty, Sept.
19, 1975, indicted Jan. 30, 1975); United States v. Bonk,
Crim. No. 75-88 (N.D. Ill., jury trial, not guilty, June 6,
1975, indicted Feb. 13, 1975).
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deposit box. An entry receipt at the vault will support
his testimony. Expert will testify to payoff conversa-
tions with Commissioner, the corroboration coming
in the form of Expert's diary entries showing the two
men were scheduled to meet on the dates of the
conversations. The other evidence is uncontested.
Commissioner twice spoke in favor of the zoning
change. Commission minuies show he voted in favor
of the change. At trial, Commissioner will deny
talking about or receiving money from Expert. They
did meet, but the conversation consisted of Expert's
attempts to persuade him of the proposal's merit.
It could be that just before Commissioner is
indicted he is subpoenaed to appear before the grand
jury. By then, his laywer has learned that the
government has dealt for and accepted Expert's
evidence. He wisely advises Commissioner to refuse
to testify. His grandjury testimony would be nothing
more than a discovery deposition. taken by the
government, or an invitation to a false statement
indictment.
Other things happen before trial. Both Developer
and Expert receive court-ordered use immunity
before appearing at the grand jury. Just before the
trial begains the trial judge, at the request of the
government, again grants use immunity to Devel-
oper and Expert.
One might wonder why the government bothered
to obtain use immunity grants when it was clear that
the decision not to prosecute the two men had been
made and communicated. The answer is that it is
a strategic play by the prosecutor which becomes
apparent during preliminary questioning of the
witnesses at trial.
The following is an example of this line of ques-
tioning:
Q: On _ 19..., did you testifylbefore
a Federal Grand Jury pursuant to a court order
granting you immunity but requiring that you testify?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When was the immunity order entered?
A: About one week before I testified, by Judge
Q: Now, would you relate to the Court and Jury
your understanding of the terms of the immunity
order under which you testified before that Federal
Grand Jury?
A: I was compelled to testify. Anything I testified
to could not be used against me in a court of law,
unless I perjured myself on the stand.
Q: You understood at that time that if you lied
under oath you could still be prosecuted for perjury?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now are you also testifying here today pursu-
ant to a court order granting you immunity?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that order was enteredjust a few hours ago
by Judge [trial judge] ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And do you understand that the terms of your
immunity are the same, that your testimony cannot be
used against you unless you give false testimony?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In addition to the order entered under the
statute granting you immunity, has any representative
of the government made you any other promise?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is that promise and who made it?
A: Mr.
[assistant United States Attorney] told me I would
not be prosecuted for anything that came during this
investigation, in return for my truthful testimony. 9
The impact on the jurors is substantial. Twice
the witnesses have been ordered by a judge to testify
truthfully. The first judge and the grand jury must
have believed them, because they were not prose-
cuted for perjury. Obviously, the government be-
lieved them. Now the trial judge is adding his
prestige to the picture the prosecutor seeks to
create, that of a witness who has nothing to fear
from telling the truth, who faces peril only if he
tells a lie. The preliminary questions create the
impression that the trial judge has reviewed and
approved of the immunized testimony. The jurors
cannot help but be impressed.
If the point somehow escapes them, they will be
reminded by the prosecutor at final argument:
Developer and Expert had no reason to lie. They
knew they could not be prosecuted if they told the
truth. They had absolutely nothing to lose by telling
the truth. Judge "s order made
it clear to them. They were told the only way they
would be prosecuted was if they told a lie. And that
is the same order they were given before they ap-
peared before the grand jury that returned this in-
dictment.
In setting out this scenario, it is not contended
that Expert is lying while Commissioner is truthful.
The point is that the case against Expert for
obtaining and keeping the money was just as strong
as, if not stronger than, the bribery case against
Commissioner. Expert was the witness and Commis-
sioner the defendant because the prosecutor so
decreed. Once the prosecutor determined his priority,
the pieces fell in place. The power of the prosecutor
in this situation is immense.
Testimony such as Expert's is inherently unre-
'Questions and answers taken from trials conducted in
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, e.g.,
United States v. Bishop, Crim. No. 74-137, at 4-6 (N.D.




liable. It is, in effect, purchased. The government
gives a reward and the seller-witness knows that.
In return, he usually is smart enough to know what
is expected of him, especially after conversations
with an agent or prosecutor. There is no require-
ment in law or practice that the immunized witness
be corroborated in matters material to his testimony.
This is not to say that agents and prosecutors tell a
witness to lie. Most really believe what is told them
by people like Expert. They want to believe, and
that which Fits the pre-ordained theory is accepted.
That which is inconsistent with the theory is rejected.
THE WITNESS WHO AT FIRST SA\YS "No"
BUT LATER SAYS "YES"
Some people, for various reasons, resolutely set
themselves against the idea of testifying on behalf of
the government. But later, after the immunity power
is felt, they have a change of heart. The best example
of that occurred during the Chicago Avenue police
investigation that eventually resulted in United
States v. Braasch. "0 The government had infor-
mation that tavern owners in the district were mak-
ing monthly payoffs to police officers as a kind of
protection. Three of the officers who allegedly ran
the "club" were subpoenaed to a grand jury. They
refused to testify, before and after being granted use
immunity. Each went to the Cook County Jail
for violating the order to testify, their term to be
the life of the grand jury or to the moment when
they decided to answer questions. Life in the
County Jail took its toll. Each man struck a
bargain: freedom, no prosecution, in return for
being a government witness. The indictment re-
sulted. They testified against fellow officers. With a
few exceptions, the policemen who were convicted
had played minor roles in the shakedown. Mostly,
they were in the "go-along" category. The three
club-leaders went free.
The jury thought the testimony was reliable, but
the machinery that brought it about must at least
make one pause to consider. First, a prosecutor
decided he needed the testimony. Then, the steps
mandated by the statute were taken. The three men,
after refusing to testify, ended up in the Cook County
Jail, an unpleasant place by any standards. They
were told, in effect, talk or stay there for 18 months.
Lawyers are trained to believe that beating people
and coercing them psychologically in order to get
statements violate the law and our sense of decency.
Basic to our distaste for those kinds of tactics is that
they result in unreliable evidence. The fact that the
10505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975).
three Chicago Avenue witnesses were coerced by a
court order does not change the nature of what
happened to them. Court orders, like blackjacks, can
be irrational and inhumane.
One of the most famous cases ever tried in the
Northern District of Illinois involved a man who did
not become the "star" government witness until after
he was indicted. William Miller was named in the
indictment with Otto Kerner and Theodore
Isaacs." His negotiations with the government
before indictment were unsuccessful. After he was
charged the negotiations continued, and an agree-
ment finally was reached: dismissal from the case in
return for his "truthful" testimony. The agreement
was contained in a letter from the United States
Attorney.
A reading of the trial transcript leads to the
conclusion there was no case without Miller's testi-
mony. If that is accurate, why then was the
indictment returned? One might conclude, as I do,
that the purpose was to recruit Miller as a govern-
ment witness. If that was the strategy, it was suc-
cessful. 12
There are other ways witnesses can start out un-
friendly to the prosecutor's theory, yet end up testi-
fying for the government. For example, assume old
friend Expert had made a statement to the IRS
agent denying he received any cash from Developer.
Or perhaps he made his denial under oath at the
grand jury. In either case, the prosecutor makes it
clear he is convinced Expert has made a false state-
ment, since he already has Developer's testimony
about the $50,000 payment. Expert is in a dilemma.
He knows he faces prosecution for his denial. If he
changes his story, to be consistent with that of De-
veloper, nothing will happen to him. He will gain
approval of the people who procure the indictments
from grand juries. After obtaining a promise of im-
munity, Expert changes his story to fit that of De-
veloper.
Expert's second story is not necessarily untrue.
The point is that the change was brought about be-
cause the prosecutor had decreed the first version to
be false. He was ready to support that decision with
the tremendous prosecutorial strength of the govern-
ment.
THE WITNESS WHO AT FIRST SAYS
"No" AND MEANS IT
Some people never do become government wit-
nesses, no matter how hard the prosecutor tries.
"United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).




There is the case of Lennie Patrick, an alleged
hoodlum. Over his objection, after immunity was
imposed by court order, he testified at a grand jury.
As a result, a Chicago police lieutenant was indicted
on income tax charges. But, at trial, Patrick refused
to testify, despite an immunity order from the trial
judge. The lieutenant was acquitted, but Patrick was
proceeded against pursuant to rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He received a
four-year sentence for his refusal to testify. The case
is on appeal at this writing. 13
Something else happened to Patrick before the
lieutenant's trial. As a result of his three immunized
grand jury appearances, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice made an $835,558 jeopardy assessment against
him for unpaid gambling taxes. His lawyers remind-
ed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that
the Supreme Court in Kasligar'4 had assured an
immunized witness that his testimony could not be
used against him. The court of appeals answered by
holding that the immunity applies only to criminal
proceedings. The assessment is civil. Patrick was
stuck. "'
Rewards for friendly witnesses, however, have
gone beyond promises of non-prosecution. The tav-
ern owners who have testified in police cases such
as the Chicago Avenue trial have received added
protection. Their immunity orders extend to city or
state license revocation proceedings. 16 In a recent
case, a lawyer-witness not only received immunity,
but gained a court order stating that his compelled
testimony could not "be used against him in any
administrative proceeding, disciplinary committee,
any bar association or state Supreme Court, in
conjunction with any professional disciplinary pro-
ceeding or disbarment."" In other words, a federal
judge told the Illinois Supreme Court it could not
use the lawyer's testimony in any disciplinary pro-
ceedings. At trial, the lawyer told how he bribed a
county commissioner to obtain zoning changes. 1"
At that same trial, the defense found a witness who
had told the prosecution something that would have
been helpful to the accused, but the witness told the
defense lawyers he would invoke the fifth amend-
ment. The government then was asked, but refused,
"United States v. Patrick, No. 75-2014 (7th Cir., heard
Apr. 14, 1976, filed Nov. 4, 1975).
" Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
"Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.
1975).
"6 See note 6 supra.
"In reJohn Daley, GrandJury No. 71-3567 (N.D. Ill.,
order dated July, 1974).
sUnited States v. Bonk, Crim. No. 75-88 (N.D. Ill.,
jury trial, not guilty, June 6, 1975, indicted Feb. 13, 1975).
to request use immunity for the defense witness. The
government had made its choice. It would believe its
own witnesses, and there would be no immunity for
someone who contradicted them.
The government has another technique for using
the immunity statute to pry testimony from unwilling
witnesses. After a man is convicted of a crime and is
sent to the penitentiary he is brought back, placed
before a grand jury, and immunized. If he refuses to
testify, he is in civil contempt and is sent to a local jail
for the life of the grand jury. His original sentence is
interrupted and does not begin to run again until he
purges himself of the contempt or the grand jury is
disbanded. This procedure was upheld in Anglin v.
Johnston. 19 There is an obvious cruelty involved in
the sentence-interruption procedure. Consider the
pressure that kind of technique puts on a man to con-
form his thoughts and words to the desires of his
questioner. For those who resist and are subjected
to longer incarceration, present law does not pro-
vide for any kind of meaningful judicial review.
HOW TO DEAL WITH AN IMMUNIZED WITNESS
The foregoing represents some of the ways people
come into contact with the government's immunity
powers. All prosecutors do not do all those things all
of the time, and there is no intent to demean or attack
the conduct of any specific United States Attorney.
But prosecutors have the power to do these things.
The point is that there are no real controls on their
behavior, except self-restraint. That is not enough.
One must consider, warily, the existence of power
and its possible exercise.
Aside from the philosophical implications arising
from the immunity power, there is, for criminal
defense lawyers, the more immediate and practical
problem of how to deal with the immunized govern-
ment witness at trial. The defense lawyer will have to
make the jury understand the way in which the
witness was created and the reasons why he therefore
is unreliable. It should be noted at this point that it
is easier to write about this task than it is to
accomplish it in a real courtroom.
There is a theme to play for the jury. It begins in
the opening statement, continues through the cross-
examination, and reaches a crescendo in the final
argument. It is that of a tainted witness with a good
See also, In re Bonk, No. 75-1925 (7th Cir., decided Oct.
29, 1975) (affirming district court's contempt order against
Bonk for -declining to answer before the grand jury nine
questions involving matters for which he had been previ-
ously acquitted).
'"Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
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reason to lie. He has done something wrong, and to
extricate himself he has sold a story to the govern-
ment. Once the prosecution indicated acceptance of
the story, the wrongdoer-seller has a vital interest in
repeating that same story to the jury. He knows that
as long as he sticks with that version no harm can
befall him. After all, it is the prosecutor-buyer who
will determine the fate of his witness.
THE OPENING STATEMENT
The defense lawyer who knows he will be facing
one or more immunized witnesses never should
waive opening statement. Reasonable men will differ
on how much to tell the jury, but after extensive
ordeals by fire I have concluded that the immunity
issue ought to be met head-on. Consider the follow-
ing:
The star government witness,
will tell you how he betrayed his trust, sold out his
badge and the public, extorted money from small
businessmen and told lies, all for his own personal
gain, for his own selfish purposes. You will hear him
say he passed some of that money along to my client,
.The evidence will show that when the
witness was threatened with indictment, realizing the
danger he was faced with, he began bargaining with
the government, again for his own personal gain, for
his own selfish purpose. The evidence will show he
concocted a story of how he paid money to my cli-
ent ... and the evidence will show he did that to get
himself off the hook. You will see that he sold his
false story to the prosecution, a story-the evidence
will show-that includes meetings and conversations
that never took place. You will hear that the witness
has immunity from prosecution, that he will not be
charged with all the things he has done, but that he
can be charged with perjury for testifying falsely. The
evidence will show has no fear
of being charged with perjury, because he has sold
his phony story to a willing listener, the prosecution.
You will see the deal has been made, and all that
must do to save himself is to tell
the same story to you.
Of course, the defense lawyer who makes that
statement must be prepared to back up his words.2 0
The jury should discern from the defense lawyer's
opening statement just what he thinks of the govern-
ment witness and the way in which the witness was
created and nurtured.
2"Some judges, however, are quite particular about
controlling opening statements which sound too much like
final argument. See United States v. Dinitz, _U.S.--, 96
S.Ct. 1075 (1976), in which the Court indicates that the
purpose of the opening statement is to summarize the facts
the evidence will show and state the issues, not give per-
sonal opinions.
Since the witness will testify to meetings and
conversations, the jury should know in advance there
will be evidence that those meetings and conversa-
tions never took place. The jury should not be
alloweo to hear the witness's testimony without first
being made aware that its truth will be challenged.
Finally, promising that a defendant will testify
is not ordinarily a good idea. Hopefully, a major
portion of the defense lawyer's purpose can be
reached during cross-examination.
CROss-EXAMINATION
Many of these prosecution witnesses, before mak-
ing their separate peace with the government, have
made statements to agents or grand juries that are at
odds with their trial testimony. But the defense
lawyer must be wary of proving too much. There is a
trap involved. For example, when the witness is
forced to admit in great detail his prior lies or
misconduct, he then might be able to convince the
jury all of that took place before his personal
reformation. He was bad, now he is good. He lied,
but now he is telling the truth.
The trap is especially deadly when the defense
lawyer goes into detail about a prior "false" state-
ment that exculpated the defendant along with the
witness. For example, if the witness told a grand
jury he never paid money to the defendant, but now
he says he did pay off, it is silly to take the position
that all the first testimony was false. That would
mean he is telling the truth at trial. The point to
make for the jury is that his current story is false.
that he is telling it for reasons of his own, and that he
knows he never will be charged with perjury as long
as he sticks with it.
A witness's motivation and expectations are legiti-
mate areas of inquiry."2 Questions directed to these
areas should be framed in a way that tightly controls
the scope of answer. "Yes", "No," and "I don't
know" are the desired answers. Unfortunately,
witnesses do not always follow scripts, for the
cross-examiner at least. What follows is a proposal
for the cross-examination of a police officer who has
testified he lied to the grand jury when he denied
taking bribes or paying money to the defendant. The
selection is lengthy, but must be so in order to con-
vey the necessary elements. Please note that some
of the questions are risky, and others may not survive
objection.
2 1 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 309 (1974); United States v.
Haggett, 438 F.2d 396, 399 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Padgent, 432 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1970); Beaudine v.
United States, 369 F.2d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1966); United




Q: When did you become a police officer?
A: January of 196".
Q: When you became a police officer, you took an
oath, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did that oath state, "I... do solemnly swear to
uphold and defend the Constitution of the
United States of America and the State of
Illinois, that I will faithfully enforce the laws of
the State of Illinois and City of Chicago, and
that I will protect life, liberty and property to
the best of my ability, so help me God?"
A: Yes, sir.
[Lawyers and public officials ordinarily take some
kind of oath.]
Q: Did you understand that that oath was going to be
binding upon you throughout your career as a
police officer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You never forgot during your career as a police
officer that you had taken that oath, did you?
A: No, sir.
Q: You violated that oath, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Through the years you were a police officer you
violated it many times, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You violated your oath because doing so was
beneficial to you, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you violated your oath when there was
something for you to gain, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You violated your oath to help yourself, didn't
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You were willing to violate your oath whenever it
was useful to you, isn't that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a Chicago police officer you were bound and
obligated to follow the rules and regulations of
the Chicago Police Department, were you not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of those rules and regulations prohibited
you from taking money from any citizen, didn't
it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Another of the rules and regulations of the Chi-
cago Police Department required that you re-
port any other police officer you found violating
the law, isn't that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You didn't do that, did you?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was to your advantage to violate those rules and
regulations, wasn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You violated those rules and regulations to suit
your own purpose, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
The Prior "False" Testimony
Q: You appeared before the grand jury on December
1, 1975, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was a large room with a number of men
and women listening to your testimony, was it
not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Before you testified you raised your right hand to
God and swore to tell the truth, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That was the same oath you took in this courtroom
today, wasn't it?
A: Yes, sir.




Q: Do you say now that you lied under oath to that
grand jury?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did so because you thought you would gain
some advantage for yourself, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You testified the way you did in order to help
yourself, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You knew then what perjury was, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You know today what perjury is, don't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you a perjurer?
A: Well, I lied to the grand jury.
Q: You know that makes you a perjurer, don't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you been charged with perjury?
A: No, sir.
The Making of the Witness
Q: After you appeared before that grand jury you
had meetings with Mr.
[prosecutor] and Agent
didn't you?
A: Yes, I did.
[At this point the witness should be asked for
details of times, places and dates of those
meetings.]
Q: During those meetings you were told you could be
charged with certain crimes, were you not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You didn't want to be charged, did you?
A: No, sir.
Q: During those discussions the prosecutor told you




Q: It was during those meetings with the prosecutor
that you decided to change your story, wasn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did that to avoid being charged, didn't
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: During those meetings you were told that if you
changed your story you would be given immu-
nity from prosecution, weren't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you changed your story in order to gain an
advantage for yourself, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You changed that story to help yourself, didn't
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You knew before you changed your story that the
prosecutor wasn't satisfied with the answers you
gave to the grand jury, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you changed your story the prosecutor
agreed to give you immunity, didn't he?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after you changed your story you knew you
would not be charged with a crime, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You knew you would not be charged with a crime
as long as you stuck with that same story, didn't
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You have not been charged, have you?
A: No, sir.
Q: You are named in this indictment as an unindicted
co-conspirator, aren't you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It is to your advantage to be named as an
unindicted co-conspirator, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You don't expect to be convicted for any of the
crimes you committed as a police officer, do
you?
A: No, sir.
Q: You don't expect to spend any time in a peniten-
tiary, do you?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you file federal income tax returns for the
years 1967 through 1970?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you signed these returns you certified under
pain and penalties of perjury that they were true
and correct, did you not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did your tax returns include the income you say
you received from tavern owners?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you been prosecuted for filing a false income
tax return?
A: No, sir.
Obviously, the cross-examiner does not always get
the answer he is seeking. At times, a witness will
throw curves. For instance, when you ask about his
conversations with the prosecutor, he might say:
A: He asked me to tell the truth.
Or, when you ask the witness about whether he
expects to be charged, he might say:
A: That's up to this jury.
If those things happen the defense attorney might
ask:
Q: Well, the prosecutor asked you questions at the
grand jury on December 1, 1976, didn't he?
A: Yes.
Q: And you knew he wanted you to tell the truth then,
didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: But you didn't do that, did you?
A: No.
Q: After that grand jury you learned he wasn't
satisfied with your testimony, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: So you went to see him, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: He didn't force you to talk to him, did he?
A: No.
Q: You went there of your own free will, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And then you had those several meetings with him
that you told us about, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you kept meeting with him until you believed
he was satisfied with your story, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, he arranged for your story to be written
down in a statement, didn't he?
A: Yes.
Q: And that statement reflects your testimony here
today, doesn't it?
A: Yes.
Q: And when you were having these meetings with
the prosecutor you knew that he was the one
who asks questions at the grand jury, didn't
you?
A: Yes.
Q: And as an experienced police officer you knew that
it is the prosecutor who decides which witness
will appear at the grand jury, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you knew that it was the prosecutor who
presents evidence to the grand jury, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: So you knew that if the prosecutor didn't present
evidence about you that you wouldn't be indict-




Q: And you haven't been indicted, have you?
A: No.
Q: And you know that if you stick to your latest story
you won't be indicted, isn't that correct?
A: Yes.
There will be cases where the witness, instead of
receiving immunity from prosecution, has plead
guilty to a lesser charge. Ordinarily, he will not be
sentenced until he completes his testimony. It is
imperative that the cross-examiner obtain the tran-
script of the guilty plea proceeding. It often will
reveal statements inconsistent with his testimony. If
you are not able to obtain a transcript, you can try to
improvise from the questions set out above, develop-
ing the proposition that the agreement was reached
with the prosecution during several of the meetings
described in the testimony. You might add:
Q: Part of your agreement was that the prosecutor
would recommend probation, was it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As you testify here today you hope for that
sentence, isn't that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you plead guilty, Judge
told you the charge of - carries
a sentence of -years, didn't he?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You knew at that time that the original charge of
- carried a - year
sentence, didn't you?
A: Yes, sir.
[This might not impeach the witness but at least it
will let the jury know the length of years the
defendant faces should he be convict-
ed.]
Q: You began talking to the prosecutor because you
didn't want to go to jail, isn't that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you still don't want to go to jail, do you?
A: No, sir.
FINAL ARGUMENT
Final argument is the defense lawyer's last oppor-
tunity to bring home to the jury the message he has
been sending throughout the trial. Again, he must
establish the buyer-seller relationship between the
witness and the prosecution. There is a fine line to
walk here because it is dangerous to accuse a
prosecutor of knowingly using perjured testimony.
Not only do you create a lifelong enemy, but since he
has the last word before the jury he can remind the
jurors of his dedication to decent law enforcement
and to pursuit of truth and justice on behalf of the
government.
The defense lawyer is better off emphatically
stating to the jury that he is not, absolutely not,
accusing the prosecutor of knowingly putting on false
testimony. It is simply that the witness was so
devious and so consumed by self-interest that he
fooled the prosecutor just as he is attempting to fool
the jury. The prosecutor, after all, was an eager
buyer. The witness was selling, and he would say
anything he thought the buyer wanted to hear to get
himself off the hook.
During one of his final arguments the prosecutor
will say that he really regretted having to use
someone like [his
witness], but how else could he root out the cancer
of corruption that is represented by the defendant?
It is for that reason, the prosecutor will say, that
his witness received immunity. He then will un-
derline the indisputable fact that the witness's grant
of immunity does not cover perjury.
The defense lawyer must anticipate that argument
by tracing the way in which the witness was created.
Consider the following suggestions:
The prosecutor argues he had to arrange immunity
from prosecution for
to take out a cancer. But what worse disease can there
be than to use the word of a man like
to unfairly and wrongfully convict
someone of a serious crime? The prosecutor says he
had no choice, that he had to take his witness as he
found him. That's not so. He had a choice. He could
have said, "We are not going to try to destroy some-
one solely on the word of
." Well, in law as in life, you make decisions.
And one decision you have to make is-how high a
price do you pay for what you get? If you force some-
one to give you something by threatening him with
indictment and jail, how reliable is it? If you dangle
a man's freedom in front of him he will say anything
he thinks you want to hear.
has learned his lesson well. He doesn't want
to be charged and he 'doesn't want to go to jail so he
tells the prosecution a series of stories; when he finds
one that he knows they want to hear, and when it is
accepted by them, he comes here and repeats it to you.
Why not? He has everything to gain and nothing to
lose, because he knows that as long as he sticks to
the story he will not be charged. If he did change it
now the buyer would call off the deal, and terrible
things, such as indictments, would happen to him.
He has to keep selling. Like any good salesman,
knows his customer. He knows
what his customer is looking for, and now he's trying
to sell the product to you. Are you buying? If -
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came to your house to sell you something
would you risk 2t on his word knowing what you
know about him? You are being asked to risk much
more in this case. 22
There are numerous possibilities and each lawyer
will have to decide for himself which approach to
take. It is my conviction that the immunized witness
must be met offensively and with indignation. By
communicating that indignation to the jury in a
professional and responsible manner, the lawyer
will be performing a service for his client.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
I do not take the view that all immunity is wrong
all the time. There are occasions when immunity can
be a reasonable prosecutorial as well as defensive
tool. But my suggestion is that immunity is too
powerful a weapon to entrust to prosecutors and
their sense of self-restraint. Kastigar and its progeny
make fruitless any attempt to seek change in the
courts. The remedy is in the Congress. Congress
should establish binding guidelines for immunity
grants. These guidelines would extend to trials,
grand jury proceedings, and administrative and
congressional hearings. The courts would be
charged with the duty of enforcing them.
I can suggest at least some of the standards which
should be imposed. The government, at a fact
hearing, should be required to show the following:
(1) That the grant of immunity is in the public
interest. That is, the government ought to make a
showing that the one to be immunized is not more
blameworthy or more culpable than the one he will
talk about. I have mentioned the three Chicago
Avenue club-leaders who went free while their
go-along associates received jail sentences. The ques-
tion is also raised in some of the extortion cases
involving public officials. Who is more culpable: the
millionaire industrialist who arranged for and paid
"As a different approach, the reader should consider the
following:
I suppose we should be charitable and have pity for
_ He is struggling to save him-
self. He's acting out of that most powerful of forces-
fear. Fear of indictment, fear of jail. At one time or
another we all act out of fear, even the child who in-
sists on a nightlight grows up to have other fears. But
decent people draw a line. They, say-I'll go this far
and no further, has gone way
beyond that line. He has no sense of decency and that
is why pity comes hard. His lies threaten to destroy a
good and decent man. And he is trying to use you
people to do it. I know you will refuse to be used that
way.
relatively small bribes to make big money, or the
salaried public official who cannot resist the tempta-
tion? Indicting the public official is easier and makes
more headlines, but is it good policy? The question is
important and merits serious debate.
For those who say immunity is the only way to
obtain evidence against wrongdoers, a reading of the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force Report is
instructive .2 3 Not only did the Watergate prosecutors
feel the witness who pleaded guilty was more credible
to a jury than the immunized witness, but,
plea bargaining is probably a better basis than a grant
of immunity for assuring that a witness does not
fabricate information he thinks the prosecutors "want
to hear" in his offer of proof, since he would expect the
offer to result only in a negotiated guilty plea rather
than in his freedom. Most important, it avoided the
unfairness of permitting one guilty of serious miscon-
duct to avoid all liability. 24
The special prosecutors recognized that plea bar-
gaining is more cumbersome than immunizing a
witness and getting his immediate cooperation. "But
the result of the practice was that no one whom the
prosecutors could prove had major responsibility for
criminal conduct was immunized on WSPF's initia-
tive."25
In the plea bargain, the man who does the
corrupting of the official would make a public and
legal admission of his criminal conduct. Here one
might pause to consider whether the public is served
by protecting the license of the lawyer who admits
that on several occasions he paid bribes to a county
commissioner. That is a very large reward to pay
for a man's testimony. Such a witness has every-
thing to gain from accommodating his testimony to
the expectations of his protector. Beyond that, con-
sider what happens to the public view of a profes-
sion that contains a self-confessed corruptor of
public officials.
(2) That there is no countervailing legal interest.
Here, one might inquire into whether the anticipated
21WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT
ch. 2 (Policy and Procedure in the Investigation and Prose-
cution of Government Officials) (1975), reprinted in 12
CRIM. L. BULL. 26 (1976).
241d. at 39 (emphasis added). On April 18, 1976,
Samuel K. Skinner, United States Attorney for the North-
ern District of Illinois, said his office would "severely
curtail" the granting of immunity from prosecution to
government witnesses. Now, he said, "We're holding out
for plea agreements." Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 1976, § 1,
at 6, col. 1.2 5
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT,
supra note 23, at 39.
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area of questioning violates first amendment rights.
At least, the right to raise the issue would serve to
deter the kind of prosecutor who used the immunity
statutes to harass and terrorize alleged radicals and
radical sympathizers in the early 1970's.
This is an appropriate place to consider the plight
of Charles Bonk, the county commissioner who
faced payoff charges in the Northern District of Ill-
inois. 26 Bonk was acquitted, despite the testimony
of two immunized lawyers. He was then given a
grand jury subpoena, immunized, and ordered to
testify. A textbook issue arises: how should a gov-
ernment treat its citizens? The real impact on Bonk
is one of harassment and continuing anxiety.
(3) That the grant is sought for the witness's
information and not for some other purpose. Implicit
in the seeking of a grant of immunity is the govern-
ment's good faith. At a hearing, a witness whose
testimony is sought ought to be given the chance to
show that the government intends some other pur-
pose. For instance:
(a) The government may be immunizing a poten-
tial defendant in order to obtain what is, in effect, a
discovery deposition. Under present law, there is
nothing to stop a prosecutor from calling in a
defendant in a pending case, putting him before the
grand jury, immunizing him, and asking him ques-
tions about the transaction with which he already has
been charged. That practice was approved in United
States v. Goldberg, 27 where the Court noted that the
immunity statute made no exception for defendants
in pending cases. The potential mischief is obvious.
(b) The immunity grant may really be a strategy
move to impress the jury. There are some prosecu-
tions where the facts are basically uncontested, where
the issue really is whether, given those facts, a federal
crime has been committed. In a recent case in the
Northern District of Illinois, a Chicago alderman
was charged with violating the mail fraud statute by
voting on matters in which he held a concealed
interest. 28 Very little was in dispute. The defense
claimed that the facts did not add up to a crime. The
jury heard evidence from witnesses who had been
granted immunity from prosecution. In effect, it re-
ceived the impression that a judge believed a crime
had been committed. Why else would he grant im-
munity? The message, admittedly, is less than clear,
but jurors are finely tuned to judicial signals. A de-
26See note 18 supra.
27472 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1973).28United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S., Mar. 22, 1976).
(No. 75-867). See also United States v. Keane, 375 F.
Supp. 1201 (N.D. Il. 1974).
fendant in such a case ought to have the right to raise
the issue.
(c) The immunity grant might be an effort to
punish a witness for non-cooperation, or to set him
up for a potential false statement charge.
The other standards which are suggested are
self-explanatory:
(4) There is a need for the testimony sought and
no other reasonable way to get it. (5) A statement
should be made of the specific area of inquiry and the
nature of the relevant questions to be asked in that
area. (6) The government should state what it ex-
pects the testimony to be and how it comes by that
expectation.
In sum, the government must show it is engaged in
a good faith attempt to gain information. I would bar
any attempt to immunize an imminent or present
defendant against his will. For a voluntary witness,
the kind who seeks immunity, I would require cor-
roboration of material parts of his testimony.before
it could be used.
Some proceeding ought to exist where the de-
fense might establish to a judge's satisfaction that
the interests of justice would be served by immuniz-
ing a potential defense witness. A defendant does
not have the constitutional right to compel the gov-
ernment to seek immunity for a defense witness who
has exercised his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 29 The hearings at which, these standards
would be litigated could be confidential, the record
sealed until such time as secrecy would not be
needed. The right to counsel must be applicable.
The list of guidelines is not exhaustive, but it is a
beginning. Admittedly, the hearings suggested would
make the prosecutor's task more laborious, but
immunity without strict legislative and judicial con-
trol is wrong and dangerous. It imperils our tradi-
tional notions of individual dignity and freedom.
CONCLUSION
For purposes of analysis and inquiry, immunity
grants were separated into two categories -volun-
tary and involuntary. My concern with the voluntary
witness, the one who seeks governmental protec-
tion, is his impact on the integrity of the fact-finding
process. To understand how he becomes a witness
is to understand the danger he poses. This is not to
29United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975). But see United
States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) for the
possibility of a due process challenge when the government




say or even suggest that all witnesses who seek and
obtain immunity are liars. But the possibility of false
testimony must be considered.
The involuntary witness arouses different concerns
although he, too, might be tempted to fit his coerced
testimony to what he thinks his questioner wants to
hear. He is the witness who has asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination but must testify anyway.
Although it is too late in the day to say that Congress
cannot constitutionally require that testimony, we
may still contemplate Mr. Justice Goldberg's view
of the privilege:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load," . .. our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual
"to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life .... It is "an expression of the moral striving
of the community.... a reflection of our common
conscience.... 30
3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 56
n.5 (1964) (citations omitted).
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